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In practice, it usually worked like this: newly drafted troops were sent into the most dangerous zones with only basic training. They were used to hold exposed ground, fill trench lines, or take the first wave of casualties so veteran units could move afterward. Their job wasn’t really to win — it was to buy time with their bodies.
Training was often rushed or symbolic. When politicians wanted fast deployment, there was no time to make competent soldiers. Many conscripts reached the front barely knowing how to operate their weapons. Survival depended more on luck and the man standing next to them than on doctrine.
Senior commanders regularly accepted high casualty rates as part of their planning. In internal reports, losses were treated as numbers, not lives. Units that suffered heavy losses were simply replenished rather than protected.
This wasn’t theoretical. It was visible in the trench warfare of World War I, rushed Soviet deployments in World War II, human-wave tactics in Korea, and the early conscription phases of the Vietnam War. Young men who had just finished school were pushed forward simply because someone had to be.
In South America, similar logic appeared during the high-tension standoff between Chile and Argentina in the late 1970s. Both sides rushed conscripts into remote, freezing zones with poor infrastructure and minimal preparation. Many of those boys weren’t meant to fight a long war — they were meant to stand there long enough to send a political message.
The only reason open war didn’t begin wasn’t military wisdom, but outside intervention. Mediation led by Pope John Paul II helped prevent combat. The soldiers were already in position. The rifles were issued. The orders existed. Only diplomacy stopped the first shots.
When the corporal tells them to write letters home, he isn’t being theatrical. Veteran noncommissioned officers in real wars often did exactly that — quietly preparing young men for the possibility that many wouldn’t return.
Not every army treats conscripts this way. Some invest heavily in training, mix inexperienced soldiers with veterans, and avoid suicidal tactics when possible. Strong leadership has saved lives in many units.
The corporal wasn’t promising death. He was warning them that in times like these — rushed deployments, political pressure, men who barely knew how to be soldiers — staying alive depended more on luck than on training.
That’s the reality he is trying to make them understand.
SUMMARY
The corporal isn’t speaking in metaphors. He’s describing how armies have actually behaved when politics move faster than preparation. In those moments, newly drafted soldiers stop being students, citizens, and sons. They become numbers inside a plan. Sometimes, the only thing that saves them isn’t training or courage, but a decision made far away not to start the war.